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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
F. Emmit Fitzpatrick & NiaLena Caravasos'
As an accompaniment to the surge of litigation, we have also
witnessed an increase in the claims of ineffective representation by
counsel. As more and more litigants are called upon to respond to such
claims, the appellate courts have been forced to delineate a basic threshold
of competence. Not only is the standard by which counsel is deemed
effective or ineffective constantly changing, but also decisions of the
higher courts have been devoid of a guideline through which future
problems may be anticipated. The review of case law below traces the
evolution of both state and federal decisions during approximately the past
fifteen years in an attempt to demonstrate the manner in which such
claims are resolved.
I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
In two cases decided in the mid-eighties, the Supreme Court of the
United States elaborated on the appropriate standards for judging claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.' United States v. Cronic involved a
conviction for mail fraud which was reversed by the Tenth Circuit on the
grounds that a young attorney who was inexperienced in criminal law was
given only twenty-five days to prepare a complex matter for trial. While
ineffectiveness was found by the Tenth Circuit on the basis of these
factors alone, the Supreme Court reversed this judgment and required a
finding of actual prejudice to the defendant.
In Strickland v. Washington, where it was held that the defendant was
not denied effective assistance of counsel because he failed to
affirmatively prove prejudice, the Supreme Court went on to define this
prejudice as a "reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome, that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different."2 The Strickland Court noted
that future courts need not ascertain whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a
result of these alleged deficiencies. 3
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1 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666-67 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984).
2 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
3 Id. at 697.
Three years later in Pennsylvania v. Pierce, 4 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania unequivocally established that the defendant must show
prejudice in order to emerge successfully from an ineffectiveness claim.
Confronted with what had been argued as uncertainty on this subject in its
earlier decision of Pennsylvania ex rel. Washington v. Marony,5 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to note that the protection granted
under Article 1, §9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was neither greater
nor lesser than the federal standard announced in Strickland. At least
regarding future consideration, a complaining defendant was not only
required to show ineffectiveness on the part of counsel but also carried the
additional burden of depicting resulting prejudice.
With the end of the eighties came a further subdivision of the two-
prong test of Strickland and Pierce by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Pennsylvania v. Durst. The Durst Court required a petitioner to
establish the following: (1) that the issue, argument, or tactic which had
been foregone by counsel had arguable merit; (2) that the particular course
chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
client's interest; and (3) that counsel's commission or omission prejudiced
the defendant.
6
Before proceeding to examine categories detailing specific instances of
ineffectiveness, it is important to realize that the constitutional guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel not only applies to juvenile
proceedings, 7 but has also received favorable greeting in summary
offenses where the effective conviction was not de minimus.8 Plea
proceedings, including investigation and negotiation 9 are not immune
from the right to conflict-free representation: indeed, the proceeding upon
which the Strickland Court opined was not a trial but rather a sentencing
proceeding following a guilty plea to first degree murder.
If, however, the defendant is represented on appeal by the same
attorney who represented him at trial, raising an ineffective assistance
claim is not practical and thus not waived by the defendant.'0 Further,
where the claim of ineffectiveness is based on a collateral attack, the post-
conviction relief act renders the prejudice requirement more stringent than
those claims which are raised on direct appeal."
4 527 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. 1987).
5 235 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1967).
6 559 A.2d 504, 505 (Pa. 1989).
7 See Matter Of Smith, 573 A.2d 1077 (Pa.Super. 1990).
8 Compare Pennsylvania v. Jenkins, 523 A.2d 813 (Pa.Super. 1987), and Borough of
Kennett Square v. Lal, 643 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa.Commw. 1994).
9 See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 657 (10th Cir. 1991).
1o See Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 See Pennsylvania v. Buehl, 658 A.2d 771, 776-77 (Pa. 1995).
II. BASIC QUALIFICATIONS OF COUNSEL
Exceptions do exist, of course, to the requirement that a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show prejudice. At the
start of the nineties, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
defendant represented by a New York attorney, who was specially
admitted to try the case in Vermont and who had obtained bar admission
in New York by fraudulent means, was entitled to relief without having to
prove prejudice. 12 One year later, this same circuit held that representation
in a criminal matter by an attorney with an admitted physical incapacity
entitled the defendant to a new trial without having to demonstrate
prejudice. 13
In the early nineties, however, the Tenth Circuit held that legal
assistance provided by an attorney who, unbeknownst to anyone, had been
disbarred seven days before trial was not per se ineffective. 14 Three years
later, the Third Circuit held that an attorney, whose license was revoked
for unrelated professional conduct after a defendant's trial, did not provide
ineffective counsel. 15 Following a similar philosophy, the Fifth Circuit, in
1998, failed to find ineffectiveness in the fact that an attorney had been
barred from practicing law at the time that he represented the defendant.
16
Also on the federal level, in the mid-nineties, prejudice was presumed
where the defendant was verbally assaulted by defense counsel, 17 and
falling asleep for extended periods of time was held to constitute
ineffective assistance. 18
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The possibility that a defendant received ineffective assistance due to
counsel's divided interests has served as the subject matter of numerous
cases. Thematic to these cases is either the personal activities of the
attorney, the attorney's prior representation of individuals connected with
the case, or the attorney's joint representation of several defendants in the
same action.
a. Divided Loyalties
12 See United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 887 (2nd Cir. 1990).
13 See Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 F.2d 626, 631 (2nd Cir. 1991).
14 See United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1992).
15 See Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119, 125 (3rd Cir. 1995).
16 See United States v. Maria-Martinez, 143 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1998).
17 See Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1994).18 See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2nd Cir. 1996).
In the mid-eighties, the Third Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel comprises two co-relative
rights: the right to counsel of reasonable competence and the right to
counsel's undivided loyalty. 19 The Zepp Court found ineffectiveness in the
fact that defense counsel faced potential criminal liability on the same
charges for which the defendant was being tried.20 The Ninth Circuit has
held counsel was likewise ineffective when a prosecution witness accused
him of purchasing some of the stolen goods in question. 21 In addition, the
Sixth Circuit found defense counsel's subsequent indictment failed to
establish per se conflict of interest.
22
Where defense counsel did not inform the defendant that he was under
investigation by the same prosecutor and further failed to institute plea
bargaining, counsel was ruled ineffective. 23 In a situation where an
attorney was required to present a defense that inculpated a former client,
the petitioner was at least entitled to a hearing on whether or not an
impermissible conflict existed.24 While these cases required a showing
that the conflict actively affected counsel's performance, they did not
necessitate that the defendant show prejudice.
b. Dual Representation
Situations involving conflict claims due to the fact that an attorney
represented someone connected with the litigation on a prior occasion, as
well as those involving the joint representation of defendants are often
decided in advance of the actual representation. Where a conflict scenario
becomes apparent, there exists a duty to bring the issue to the Court's
attention and move for the disqualification of offending counsel if
necessary. 25 If a defendant can show that his attorney actively represented
conflicting interests and that this actual conflict adversely affected the
lawyer's performance, no further showing of prejudice is required.26 At a
pretrial hearing before the trial judge, the defendant is asked to waive his
right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel at some future date in order
to allow counsel's continued representation. In some instances, the Court
is asked to determine whether counsel's prior representation of a witness
might result in restricting the attorney's cross-examination of that witness
due to confidential facts disclosed in the past. In the event that the trial
19 See Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 131 (3rd Cir. 1984).20 [d at 136.
21 See Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1988).
22 See Taylor v. United States, 985 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1993).
23 See United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463 (11 th Cir. 1987).
24 See Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1508-09(10th Cir. 1991).
25 See United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1991).
26 See Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Mathis v. Hood,
937 F.2d 790, 795 (2nd Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700, 702 (Pa.
1992).
court disqualifies defense counsel, that order is not immediately
appealable in the federal system,27 while it is so appealable in
Pennsylvania.
28
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized a presumption in
favor of a defendant's counsel of choice and requires that presumption to
be overcome by a demonstration of either actual conflict or a showing of
serious potential for conflict. 29 The fact that an attorney representing
witnesses before an investigating grand jury, was formerly associated with
an attorney representing the target of the grand jury investigation is not
sufficient grounds upon which to disqualify the attorney representing
witnesses. It is the same court, however, which found that an attorney's
representation of a subsequent client whose interests were materially
adverse to a former client in a case substantially related to matters in
which he represented the former client was an impermissible conflict of
interest which required removal.3'
The principles involved in deciding conflict of interest cases which
deal with the multiple representation of defendants further transcend to
matters involving the defendant's prior representation of a witness. 32 The
Third Circuit not only disqualified an attorney who had previously
represented the employees of the defendant, who would be testifying for
the government and against the defendant at trial, but also took the
opportunity to suppress statements of the employees given to counsel on
the basis of the attorney-client privilege. 33 Indeed, the earlier
representation of a wife barred an attorney from representing her husband
in an action dissolving a marriage. 34 Further, an actual conflict was
presented by the fact that defense counsel represented both the defendant
and a Commonwealth witness. 35 Even the overwhelming weight of
evidence could not justify the denial of relief upon a finding of actual
conflict of interest by counsel's simultaneous but undisclosed
representation of a DEA agent who testified against the defendant at
trial.36 Exemplifying the logic behind the rule was Pennsylvania v.
Westbrook, a case where the Defender Association represented both the
defendant and the defendant's brother: the defendant attempted to show
that the robbery was actually committed by his brother but was unable to
27 See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 269 (1984).
28 See Pennsylvania v. Cassidy, 568 A.2d 693, 694 (Pa.Super. 1989).29 [d. at 698.
30 See Philadelphia Grand Jury v. Vladimer, 605 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa. 1992).
31 See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton and Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1287 (Pa.
1992).
32 See United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 609 (10th Cir. 1983).
33 See United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 753 (3rd Cir. 1991).34 See Thomas v. Municipal Court, 878 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1989).
35 See In re Saladin, 518 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa.Super. 1986).
36 See Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1982).
do so because the Defender would not permit his brother to make a
statement. The Westbrook Court found the existence of an actual conflict
of interest.
37
The joint representation of co-defendants is not, per se, violative of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.38 However,
requiring one attorney to represent two defendants with conflicting
interests is certainly a violation.
39
The Eleventh Circuit found that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected the performance of an attorney who simultaneously represented
both the defendant, who claimed self-defense, and the victim's life
insurance policy beneficiary, who could have lost benefits if the victim
was found to be the aggressor. In a case where neither co-defendant
relied upon a defense which was antagonistic to the other, joint
representation did not give rise to a conflict of interest.41
c. Waiver Of Conflict Of Interest
The United States Supreme Court has held that the trial court must be
allowed substantial latitude in granting or refusing waivers of conflict of
interest.42 This waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel in dual
representation cases can be valid even if the court does not conduct an on-
the-record inquiry as long as the waiver is found to be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent.43 The appellate courts at both the federal and
the state levels have upheld the validity of a defendant's waiver of his right
to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.44 The Seventh Circuit, however,
has held that a defendant who consents to joint representation must show
actual, rather than potential, conflict of interest to later have his conviction
set aside.45
Requiring a defendant to waive his right to a future claim alleging that
his attorney did not properly represent his interests is highly speculative.
The ability to specifically outline the risk that the defendant is agreeing to
take is very often beyond the informed imaginings of either the prosecutor
37 400 A.2d. 160, 162 (Pa. 1979).
38See Hayes v. Lockhart, 766 F.2d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1985).
39 See Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 285 (4th Cir. 1990)(citing Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60,70 (1942)).
40See McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990).
41 See Pennsylvania v. Rodriguez, 549 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa.. Super. 1988) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Joyner, 414 A.2d 1003, 1005 (Pa. Super. 1980)).
42 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).
43 See William v. Meachum, 948 F.2d 863, 866 (2nd Cir. 1991); see also Henderson v.
Smith, 903 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1990).
44 See United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1389 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Pennsylvania
v. Szekeresh, 515 A.2d 605, 609 (Pa. Super. 1986).
45 See Bush v. United States, 765 F.2d 683, 685 (7th Cir. 1985)(citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)).
or the Court. Further, our legal system makes up for shortcomings in the
intellectual ability of certain defendants to comprehend the proceedings
against them by requiring that they be represented by individuals trained
and experienced in the law. Yet it is a possible lack of loyalty that a
defendant on his own is asked to evaluate.
In addition to those cases dealing with the basic qualifications of
counsel and the complex problems presented by conflict of interest claims,
there have been thousands of allegations made regarding specific action or
inaction on the part of individual attorneys. Since the claims concern
highly specific instances, they do not easily support a guide for future
conduct. While these cases were decided under the standard of review
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v.
Washington 4 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth
v. Pierce, 47 they spoke more to the specific type of conduct on the part of
counsel than to the prejudice of the defendant. While the defendant is
required to show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's error, that
determination encompasses an overall view of the strength of the
prosecution's case as well as judicial speculation as to the level of strength
absent counsel's error. The following cases concern themselves not with
this decision but merely with the type of conduct that has been held, in
specific instances, to be error on the part of counsel.
IV. ADVICE OF COUNSEL
When the advice of counsel is challenged, as it often is in the area of
guilty pleas, the relevant test is whether that advice was within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. In order to
establish ineffectiveness regarding counsel's advice to reject a plea
bargain, the defendant carries "the burden of proving that counsel had no
reasonable basis for his advice." 48 Additionally, a claim of ineffective
counsel cannot be based upon advice from outside counsel whom the
defendant chose to consult.49 Even if counsel's advice is deemed deficient,
the defendant must nevertheless still demonstrate that, "but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial."5
Various circuits in the federal system have uniformly held
ineffectiveness to exist in counsel's failure to file an appeal after a client's
46 See supra note 1.
47 See supra note 2.
48 Pennsylvania v. Boyd, 688 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1997).
49 See United States v. Martini, 31 F.3d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1994).
50 Jackson v. United States, 976 F.2d 679, 681 (11th Cir. 1992)(citing United States v.
Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir. 1986)).
request to do so.51 Moreover, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that,
unless expressly waived, counsel's failure to properly effectuate an
appellant's right to appeal is per se ineffective.
52
Not only has the Third Circuit held that counsel's misrepresentation
regarding the likely success of appeal was ineffective, 53 but the Eighth
Circuit has also held that a defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel when his attorney incorrectly informed him that he would have to
serve only one-sixth of his plea bargain sentence. 54 The Second Circuit, in
1998, similarly characterized counsel's gross underestimation of the
sentence facing the client. 55 Further, counsel was held to be ineffective not
only for failing to move to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere where the
defendant had not been advised that he would be exposed to consecutive
sentences,56 but also for failing to move to withdraw a guilty plea after the
defendant's motion to suppress had been granted.57 Counsel's failure to
advise the defendant of the pros and cons of an appeal as well as the time
limit, coupled with his failure to determine whether the defendant wanted
to embark upon such a course, was deemed ineffective. 58 A petitioner was
entitled to a hearing upon whether or not his plea was coerced as a result
of the fact that his attorney threatened to withdraw if the plea were not
entered.59
Failure to inform the defendant of a plea offer was ineffective, 60 as
was the advice to plead guilty rather than stand trial.6' Confusion on the
part of trial counsel regarding the law made him ineffective in failing to
advise the defendant that if he successfully withdrew his plea of guilt to
second degree murder, he would be subject to a first degree murder
conviction. 62 A similar fate of ineffectiveness was met by counsel whose
51 See Martin v. United States, 81 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39,
42 (4th Cir. 1993).
52 See In the Interest of A.P., 617 A.2d 764 (Pa.Super. 1992)(citing Pennsylvania v.
Wilkerson, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980)).
53 See Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 92 (3rd Cir. 1996).
54 See Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Hill v. Lockhart,
894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990).
55 See United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2nd Cir. 1998).
56 See Pennsylvania v. Jones, 640 A.2d 1330, 1335 (Pa.Super. 1994).
57 See United States v. Alverez-Tautimez, 160 F.3d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1998).
58 See United States v. Gipson, 985 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Baker v.
Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1991) and Pennsylvania v. Quier, 531 A.2d
8, 11 (Pa.Super. 1987).5 9 See Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 559, 562 (3rd Cir. 1991).
60 See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 498 (2nd Cir. 1996); United States v. Rodriguez, 929
F.2d 747, 752 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Pennsylvania v. Korb, 617 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa.
Super. 1992).
61 See Woodward v. Collins, 898 F.2d 1027, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107, 1114 (Pa. Super. 1990).
62 See Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 888 (6th Cir. 1991).
failure to advise a client about the withdrawal of a guilty plea to third
degree murder resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. 3
In Underwood v. Clark,64 however, the Seventh Circuit noted not only
that an attorney was not ineffective in advising his client not to testify
despite his constitutional right not to take the stand, but also that counsel
is not required to consult with his client on all tactical moves. More
recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court voiced that in order to sustain a
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call the defendant to
testify, he must demonstrate that "counsel interfered with his right to
testify. . ." or else gave advice "so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing
and intelligent decision. ... 65
V. TRIAL TACTICS
In reviewing those cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is advanced regarding an attorney's action or inaction during the
litigation process itself, the First Circuit has noted that "the Constitution
does not guarantee a defendant a letter perfect defense or a successful
defense; rather, the performance standard is that of reasonably effective
assistance under the circumstances." 66 The Natanel Court specifically held
that counsel's waiver of a closing argument did not constitute ineffective
assistance. However, a contrary result was reached by the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania in Pennsylvania v. Sparks.67 Calling a witness to the stand
merely on a hunch was deemed ineffective when the witness identified the
defendant as a robber.68 Advising a defendant not to testify that she had
ingested methamphetamine under a mistaken belief that it was illegal to
ingest this substance dictated a similar result.69
a. Investigation
i. Witnesses
Counsel's failure to properly prepare for trial has served as the subject
of appellate inquiry. A constant theme regarding effective representation
concerns witnesses. Counsel's failure to interview or call eyewitnesses
was deemed ineffective, 70 as was the failure to attempt to find and
63 See Pennsylvania v. Bradley, 715 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. 1998).
64 See 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991).
65 Pennsylvania v. Breisch, 719 A.2d 352, 355 (Pa.Super. 1998).
66 United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309-310 (1st Cir. 1991).
67 539 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super. 1988) (holding trial counsel's failure to make closing
argument in robbery and rape prosecution was unreasonable and rendered his assistance
constitutionally ineffective).
68 See Pennsylvania v. Tippens, 598 A.2d 553, 556 (Pa.Super. 1991).
69See Morris v. California, 945 F.2d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991).
70 See Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 829-832 (8th Cir. 1990) (where no
witness called to support self-defense claim). But cf, Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173,
interview potential alibi witnesses 71 and the failure to use reasonable
efforts to procure three alibi witnesses.
72
On the other hand, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
rejected by the Tenth Circuit when the defendant failed to supply counsel
with names and addresses of prospective witnesses. 73 A decision not to
interview prosecution witnesses did not result in ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel was aware of the substance of the witnesses'
testimony in advance. 74 In the mid-nineties, however, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the failure to interview witnesses in a death
penalty prosecution was ineffective, arguably per se. 75 More recently, this
same court delineated the standard for the successful launching of an
ineffectiveness claim to include the following: (a) the existence and
availability of the witness; (b) counsel's awareness of or duty to know
about the witness; (c) the willingness as well as the ability of the witness
to appear on the defendant's behalf; and (d) the necessity of the proposed
testimony for an avoidance of prejudice. 76
In United States v. Gray,77 the Third Circuit was faced with a claim of
ineffectiveness based upon counsel's failure to conduct a pretrial
investigation. The defendant had supplied the names of potential
witnesses but expressed his reluctance to subpoena these witnesses and
compel their attendance at trial. Counsel went no further. The Gray Court
found ineffectiveness in light of its belief that counsel could have well
established a credible defense had he interviewed and subpoenaed these
witnesses. The Court further noted that the effect of counsel's inadequate
performance must be evaluated in light of the totality of evidence at trial
and opined that an outcome which was only weakly supported by the
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one for which
the record harbors overwhelming support.
78
One year later, a different panel of the Third Circuit reached the exact
opposite result in Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz. 79 In finding that the defendant
failed to show any prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to interview
and present potential defense witnesses in reference to his claim of self-
1177-78 (5th Cir.1985); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093 n. 5 (5th Cir.1982) (stating,
[although] "a lawyer's failure to investigate a witness who has been identified as crucial
may indicate an inadequate investigation, the failure to investigate everyone whose name
happens to be mentioned by the defendant does not suggest ineffective assistance.").
71 See Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127, 129-130 (8th Cir. 1990).
72 See Tosh v. Lockhart, 879 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1989).
73 See United States v. King, 936 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1991).7 4 See Wing v. Sargent, 940 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1991).
75 See Pennsylvania v. Perry, 644 A.2d 705, 709 (Pa. 1994).
76 See Pennsylvania v. Priovolos, 715 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1998).
77 878 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1989).
7 81d. at 711-713.
79 915 F.2d 106 (3rd Cir. 1990).
defense, the Court stated that they believed such a decision was within the
exercise of counsel's reasonable professional judgment.80
Not only was a defendant denied effective assistance of counsel due to
an attorney's failure to interview witnesses,81 but ineffectiveness was also
found in counsel's failure to ascertain that a witness was in jail rather than
at home speaking to the defendant, per his testimony. 82 Counsel was held
ineffective in the federal system for failing to interview witnesses and the
co-defendant before trial,83 as well as for failing to, not only confer with
the defendant for two months, but also to seek discovery, investigate the
crime, and interview witnesses. 84 Failure to investigate and present
evidence that a shooting was accidental and at close range, 85 as well as
failure to contact and subpoena alibi witnesses and notify the prosecution
of their existence86 both met a similar fate of ineffectiveness.
ii. Mental Health
At the start of the nineties, various circuits held that defense counsel's
almost complete lack of investigation and resulting ignorance regarding
the defendant's mental and family history as well as the failure to argue
mitigating factors to the jury during the death penalty phase of a homicide
trial constituted ineffective assistance. 87 In an interesting sidelight, the
Brewer Court refused to hold that the presentation of perjured testimony at
the defendant's request was adequate to constitute ineffectiveness.
88
Failure to investigate the defendant's psychiatric background and
competency has been greeted with a similar reception in the federal
system.89 For failing to investigate mental illness, 90 and for abandoning all
consideration of an extreme emotional disturbance defense at an early
stage for no apparent reason, ineffectiveness has also been found. 91
Following a similar philosophy, counsel's performance in obtaining and
presenting a psychiatric witness has been held to be deficient,92 while the
failure to pursue an independent psychological analysis of the defendant
80Id. at 114-115.
81 See Pennsylvania v. Woodward, 614 A.2d 239, 244-245 (Pa.Super. 1992).
82 See Pennsylvania v. Baxter, 640 A.2d 1271, 1274-1275 (Pa. 1994).
83 See Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1418-1419 (5th Cir. 1996).
84See Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213, 1216-1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
85 See Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580-1581 (6th Cir. 1992).
86 See Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358-1359 (4th Cir. 1992).
87 See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1461-1463 (11th Cir. 1991); Kenley v.
Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1303-1305 (8th Cir. 1991); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850,
855-858 (7th Cir. 1991).88 See 935 F.2d at 859-860.
89 See Agan v. Singletary, 12 F.3d 1012 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
90 See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1517 (10th Cir. 1997).
91 See DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 585 (2nd Cir. 1996).
92 See Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997).
in a death case has been deemed not to be professionally reasonable. 93
Further, the Third Circuit has found ineffective assistance in the failure to
investigate an insanity defense despite the presence of a letter from a
psychiatrist, 94 while the Fifth Circuit has viewed the failure to investigate
the defendant's competency to stand trial or the viability of an insanity
defense with a similar eye. 95 Lastly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1998 found ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present a
defense of diminished capacity.
96
iii. Miscellaneous
Both in 1998 as well as in the previous year, the Ninth Circuit has
consistently held that the failure to investigate the defendant's denial of
presence at the scene and, if appropriate, to present an alibi defense was
ineffective. 97 Counsel's decision not to investigate the lack of medical
evidence of abuse met a similar fate, 98 as did the failure to follow up on an
exculpatory report regarding semen.
9 9
iv. Mitigation
In two consecutive years, the Seventh Circuit has held that not only
was counsel in a capital case ineffective in preparation and presentation,
but also ineffectiveness emerged as the outcome from the failure to
investigate mitigating circumstances. 1° 1 Finally, a similar result emerged
from the Ninth Circuit due to counsel's failure to prepare and present a
case for mitigation at sentencing. 10 2 After evaluating counsel's failure to
override the defendant's decision not to present mitigating evidence during
the penalty phase, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1998
declined to breathe life into the defendant's ineffectiveness claim.
10 3
b. Courtroom Performance
Counsel's courtroom performance has always been the subject of much
judicial hindsight. Reporting ready for trial when essential defense
witnesses were unavailable was deemed ineffective, 10 4 as was the failure
93 See United States v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 156-157 (5th Cir. 1992).
94 See United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 190 (3rd Cir. 1997).
95 See Boucchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595-596(5th Cir. 1990).
96 See Pennsylvania v. Legg, 711 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1998).
97 See Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Baldwin, 114
F.3d 835, 838-839 (9th Cir. 1997).
98 See Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1385-1386 (11th Cir. 1998).
99 See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996).
100 See Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 1997).101 See Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906-907 (7th Cir. 1996).
102 See Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Hendricks v.
Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995) (failure to investigate mental defense was
not ineffective assistance as to guilt phase, but counsel's failure to investigate and present
mitigating circumstances was ineffective as to sentencing phase).
103 See Pennsylvania v. Taylor, 718 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1998).
104 See Pennsylvania v. Morocco, 544 A.2d 965, 972 (Pa.Super. 1988).
to request a continuance in order to produce necessary defense
witnesses. 10 5 A haven for ineffective assistance has also been found
nestled not only in counsel's failure to voir dire the jury after a juror
brought a newspaper story into the jury room, 10 6 but also in the absence of
a request for a mistrial following the prosecution's mention of post-arrest
silence.
10 7
i. Argument
The failure to present adequate argument during a court proceeding
has been viewed with disfavor. 10 8 Moreover, where trial counsel told the
jury during the opening statement that he would call an expert witness and
then failed to do so, his assistance was deemed ineffective. 10 9 Defense
counsel's concession during closing that no reasonable doubt existed
regarding the only factual issues in dispute was per se prejudicial." 0
ii. Miscellaneous
Both attitude as well as conduct displayed during a trial made an
attorney ineffective,"' as did becoming angry at the judge and failing to
present a defense. 112 Counsel was further ineffective in failing to have a
theory, cross-examine witnesses, voice objections to evidence, and present
witnesses to show mitigating circumstances. 113 In a rape case, failure to
develop a defense of impotency was categorized as ineffective. 114 In one
situation, counsel's failure to call the defendant to the stand embodied
ineffective assistance, 115 whereas, in another case, a similar result ensued
from counsel's strategy in calling the defendant to the stand and
proceeding to characterize him as both a thief and a liar.116 Ineffectiveness
was absent, however, not only where the defendant was provided with the
opportunity to testify as opposed to being asked specific questions in a
situation where counsel suspected the defendant of lying, 117 but also
where counsel failed to require that the government prove the
methamphetamine to be of a particular type.118
iii. Pretrial Motions
105 See Walker v. Lockhart, 807 F.2d 136, 139 (8th Cir. 1986).
106 See Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 579-60 (3rd Cir. 1994).107 See Pennsylvania v. Drass, 718 A.2d 816, 821 (Pa.Super. 1998).
108 See United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (3rd Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania
v. McMullen, 530 A.2d 450, 453 (Pa.Super. 1987).
109 See Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1988).
110 See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 1991).
111 See Ward v. United States, 995 F.2d 1317, 1322 (6th Cir. 1993).
112See Tejeda v. DuBois, 142 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1998).
113 See Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1170-71 (6th Cir. 1997).
114 See Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722,727-28 (8th Cir. 1993).
115 See Pennsylvania v. Neal, 618 A.2d 438, 441 (Pa.Super. 1992).
116See Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995).117 See Pennsylvania v. Jermyn, 620 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993).
118 See United States v. Warren, 149 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1998).
Regarding pretrial motions, assistance provided by attorneys has been
categorized as ineffective for their failure to file a proper suppression
motion,119 or failure to file one at all. 120 The failure to challenge a lineup
met the same fate. 121 In another case, remand for a hearing was required
due to counsel's failure to raise a suppression issue as to evidence elicited
from a wired informant entering a house.
122
iv. Witnesses
"The failure to call a potential witness is not per se ineffectiveness
absent positive demonstration that the testimony would have been helpful
to the defense."'123 Similarly, the viability of an ineffectiveness claim was
not established for the failure to call character witnesses without evidence
that any specific witness would have presented character evidence at the
trial. 24 Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as well as the Superior
Court, however, deemed the failure to call character witnesses as
ineffective. 125 Another case held that counsel's failure to call character
witnesses in a first degree murder trial resulted in the kind of prejudice
which required a new trial.126 In reference to a claim of ineffective
assistance in connection with counsel's failure to call two named alibi
witnesses, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the trial court
should have granted a hearing. 127 On the federal level, ineffectiveness was
found nestled in counsel's failure to contact two witnesses who could
vouch for the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the incident.
128
v. Cross-Examination
On both the state and federal level, even the highly individualized
practice of conducting cross-examination has been held ineffective where
counsel has failed to take advantage of universally acknowledged tools of
impeachment. 129 Ineffectiveness has found haven in counsel's failure to
both impeach an informant,130 and failure to object to a letter written by
119 See Smith v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 494, 498 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Lester, 572
A.2d 694, 700 (Pa.Super. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 804-41
(Pa.Super. 1989).
120 See Pennsylvania v. Kilgore, 719 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa.Super. 1998); Pennsylvania v.
Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Pa.Super. 1995).
121 See Tomlin v. Myers, 30 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994).
122 See Pennsylvania v. Bannister, 656 A.2d 129, 133 (Pa.Super. 1995).
123 Pennsylvania v. Carbone, 707 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Pa.Super. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania
v. Bulard, 451 A.2d 760, 764 (Pa.Super. 1982)).
124 See Pennsylvania v. Jones, 652 A.2d 386, 390 (Pa.Super. 1995).
125 See Pennsylvania v. Weiss, 606 A.2d 439, 443 (Pa. 1992); Pennsylvania v. Gillespie,
620 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 1993).
126 See Pennsylvania v. Glover, 619 A.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Pa.Super. 1993).
127 See Pennsylvania v. Stanley, 632 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. 1993).
128See Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (6th Cir. 1992).
129 See Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112, 115 (1 lth Cir. 1989); Pennsylvania v. Murphy,
591 A.2d 278, 281-82 (Pa. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Bolden, 534 A.2d 456, 459 (Pa. 1987);
Pennsylvania v Strutt, 624 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa.Super. 1993).
130 See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997).
the victim which had found its way into counsel's possession.' 3' In the
Third Circuit, ineffective assistance took the form of failing to use a
witness' inconsistent testimony, opening the door, and failing to call
defense witnesses. 132 In the state system, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that the failure to impeach the victim's credibility with evidence of
charges pending against her at time of trial was ineffective assistance of
counsel. 1
33
vi. Objections
Not objecting to the admission of a co-defendant's confession and
hearsay as well as failing to request a missing witness instruction were
deemed ineffective. 134 Further, allowing the victim's wife to testify
without objection to hearsay statements, which provided principal
evidence of premeditation, constituted ineffective assistance. 135 Failing to
lodge objections to questions regarding an untrue statement given to
police by the defendant gave rise to a successful claim of
ineffectiveness. 136 Counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or
arguments has provided a haven for ineffective assistance, 137 as have the
lack of objections to an erroneous verdict sheet 138 and to the introduction
of the defendant's criminal history.
139
For failing to lodge an objection to testimony from a detective
regarding the hearsay statement of a non-testifying co-defendant, 140 as
well as for failing to object to a trooper's testimony which commented on
a defendant's silence after he was advised of his rights, ineffectiveness
prevailed. 14 1 Ineffective assistance has also been found in counsel's failure
to object to a prosecutor's cross-examination during which the defendant
was forced to admit that he made no assertion of self-defense prior to
trial, 142 as well as in counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor
attempted to impeach the credibility of a defense witness with untried
criminal charges.
143
131 See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 684 (7th Cir. 1995).
132See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1105 (3rd Cir. 1996).
133 See Pennsylvania v. Davis, 652 A.2d 885, 890 (Pa.Super. 1995).
134 See Henry v. Scully, 78 F.3d 51, 52-3 (2nd Cir. 1996); see also Mason v. Hanks, 97
F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1996).
135 See Bolander v. Iowa, 978 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1992).
136See Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1996).
137 See Atkins v. Attorney General of Alabama, 932 F.2d 1430, 1432 (11th Cir. 1991);
Pennsylvania v. Barnes, 593 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa.Super. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Dickerson,
590 A.2d 766, 773-74 (Pa.Super. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Thomas, 578 A.2d 422, 428-29
(Pa.Super. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Smith, 567 A.2d 1080 (Pa.Super. 1989).
138 See Pennsylvania v. DeHart, 650 A.2d 38, 49 (Pa. 1994).
139 See Pennsylvania v. Moore, 715 A.2d 448, 452-53 (Pa.Super. 1998).
140 See Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d 38, 45 (2nd Cir. 1994).
141 See Pennsylvania v. Hyneman, 622 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 1993).
142 See Pennsylvania v. Clark, 626 A.2d 154 (Pa. 1993).
143 See Pennsylvania v. Doswell, 621 A.2d 104 (Pa. 1993).
vii. Mental Health
Failure to pursue an insanity defense after the defendant had been
ruled incompetent was held to be ineffective by the First Circuit. 144 Other
circuits have deemed counsel ineffective as a result of failing to introduce
psychiatric evidence during the penalty phase, 145 as well as for failing to
introduce evidence of the defendant's long history of mental illness at a
similar proceeding.
146
viii. Jury Instructions
Counsel's failure to request or object to jury instructions has also not
escaped scrutiny. 147 Ineffectiveness has surfaced as a result of failing to
request proper jury instructions, 148 specifically in reference to instructions
on, "preponderance of the evidence,"'149 self-defense, 1
50 recklessness, 151
and receiving identification evidence with caution.152 Attorneys have also
been held ineffective not only for failing to voice objections to charges on
mitigating circumstances, 153 but also for not lodging objections to both an
alibi charge, 154 as well as to the omission of such a charge.
155
ix. Post-trial Matters
In reference to post-trial matters, failure to request a downward
adjustment for minimal or minor participation was found to be
ineffective, 156 as was the failure to argue that the government breached a
plea agreement by not moving for a downward departure. 157 Also held
ineffective was counsel's failure to educate the jury about aggravating and
mitigating factors, 158 as well as the failure to pursue a defendant's mental
state during the penalty phase. 159 Ineffective assistance also found refuge
in counsel's failure to move for the reconsideration of a sentence to which
144See Genius v. Pepe, 50 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1995).
145 See Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 847 (8th Cir. 1994).
146 See Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1995).
147 See Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania v.
Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782 (Pa. 1989); Pennsylvania v. Gass, 523 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa.
1987); Pennsylvania v. Horwat, 515 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. 1986); Pensylvania v. Boyd, 514
A.2d 623, 625-26 (Pa.Super. 1986).
148 See Pennsylvania v. Hutchinson, 621 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa.Super. 1993).
149 See Pennsylvania v. Clark, 683 A.2d 901, 908 (Pa.Super. 1996).
150 See United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1996); Pennsylvania v.
Buska, 655 A.2d 576, 586 (Pa.Super. 1995).
151 See Pennsylvania v. Horton, 644 A.2d 181, 187-88 (Pa.Super. 1994).
152 See Pennsylvania v. Simmons, 647 A.2d 568, 570 (Pa.Super. 1994).
153 See Pennsylvania v. Blount, 647 A.2d 199, 209-10 (Pa. 1994).
154 See Pennsylvania v. Allison, 622 A.2d 950, 953 (Pa.Super. 1993).155 See Pennsylvania v. Roxberry, 602 A.2d 826, 828-29 (Pa. 1992).
156 See United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
157 See United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993).
158 See Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 848-49 (6th Cir. 1997); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204,
1211 (6th Cir. 1995).
159 See Pennsylvania v. Smith, 675 A.2d 1221, 1234 (Pa. 1996).
the deadly weapon enhancement was applied to automobiles, 160 as well as
in the absence of raising a Rosario claim on appeal. 16 1 Finally, the failure
of counsel to raise error of the trial court in post-verdict motions has been
greeted with a similar reception, 162 as has counsel's neglect to request
plain error appellate review for an erroneous first degree murderinstruction. 163
x. Time Frame To Claim Ineffectiveness
A remaining dilemma centers around the appropriate time frame
during which an ineffectiveness claim should be brought to the Court's
attention. Pennsylvania requires that this be done at the "earliest stage in
the proceedings at which counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged
no longer represents the defendant." 164 Federal courts, however, are a little
less certain and, despite similar language, the Seventh Circuit has held that
a defendant who wishes to support his claim with facts outside the record
would be well advised to wait until the post-conviction stage before
raising a claim of ineffective counsel. 165 Although it felt that such claims
should initially be brought to the trial court, the Second Circuit
nevertheless noted that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be
decided when raised for the first time on appeal when either "the
resolution is beyond any doubt or when to do so would be in the interest
of justice.'166 The First Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled that the
defendant's failure to alert the trial court to his claim of ineffective
assistance precluded appellate review. 16 7 A similar view was adopted by
the Third Circuit in requiring that a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel should have properly been raised in a post-conviction
proceeding.
168
VI. CONCLUSION
160 See Pennsylvania v. Batterson, 601 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa.Super. 1992).
161 See Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 538-39 (2nd Cir. 1994) (Under the Rosario rule
the prosecutor is required to make available to the defendant prior to trial "any written or
recorded statement ...made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a
witness at trial, and which relates to the subject matter of the witness' testimony." N.Y.
Crim. Proc. §240.45 (1)(a)).
162 See Pennsylvania v. Erie, 521 A.2d 464, 469 (Pa.Super. 1987).
163 See Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 1998).
164 Pennsylvania v. Pizzo, 602 A.2d 823, 824 (Pa. 1992) (citing Pennsylvania v. Hubbard,
372 A.2d 687, 695 n.6 (1977)). See Pennsylvania v. House, 537 A.2d 361 (Pa.Super.
1988).
165 See United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1991).
166 United States v. Matos, 905 F.2d 30, 32 (2nd Cir. 1990).
167 See United States v. Hoyos-Medina, 878 F.2d 21, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1989).
168 See United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 230, 235 (3rd Cir. 1991).
What emerges quite clearly from this review of case law as it has
developed through the years is that there is great difficulty attached in
trying to predict exactly what type of conduct may be deemed ineffective
in the future. Indeed, a refuge for ineffectiveness was not to be found in an
attorney's failure to anticipate a new Supreme Court rule regarding the
element of willfulness in money laundering. 169 Moreover, even an obvious
deviation from reasonable trial strategy can fail to effect relief because the
requisite prejudice is not shown. 170
The only way to avoid ineffectiveness in the future is to become
familiar with the areas where the court has found counsel to have been
ineffective in the past. One can neither anticipate nor cite to any trend in
the law that specifically points out future ineffectiveness. At this point in
time, expert witnesses cannot be called regarding a determination of
ineffective assistance because such determination is made not by a jury
but rather by an experienced trial judge.
Regrettably, the only guidance that courts are providing are the cases
in which they find either the presence or absence of ineffectiveness. Only
a continuing review of appellate court decisions can serve as a manual for
effective legal representation.
169 See United States v. McNamara, 74 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1996).
170 See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1991).
